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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [OSCE](#) [GG](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MFA'S HARDLINE VIEW ON OSCE NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Political MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

¶1. (C) The MFA told us January 28 that Russia had rejected the Greek proposal on "legal" grounds but stated that Russia would be ready to accept two equal-ranked mission offices (one in Georgia and one in South Ossetia) that reported to a "chapeau" organization in Vienna, but not one that reports directly to the CiO. Claiming that such a structure would violate the roles and responsibilities of the CiO, the GoR is open to a task force or similar organization under the Conflict Prevention Center. Russia is not in a hurry to renew the mandate for the mission in Georgia and will reject any mandate which authorizes monitors to operate in South Ossetia. The GoR will consider a technical roll-over of the twenty existing monitors in Georgia proper. End summary.

Georgia OSCE Mission Mandate

¶2. (C) On a January 28, Russian MFA Deputy Director for OSCE Alexei Polishuk briefed us on the recent visit of Greek Foreign Minister and OSCE CiO Dora Bakoyannis to Moscow on January 21 (more on visit of Bakoyannis septel). Polishuk told us that Russia only agreed to a "chapeau" organization in Vienna and to missions to South Ossetia and Georgia, but rejected that the missions or the coordinating office would report directly to the CiO. In the ministry's view, any such arrangement would violate Decision 8 of 2002, which outlines the CiO's functions. The GoR would also reject any proposal where Georgia would receive a full mission and South Ossetia would only host a support or subordinate organization -- "they must be equal." That said, Polishuk told us that Russia would support both organizations reporting to a task force or similar body that reported to the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), but objected to the vague language that the Stability and Security Office (SSO) would only be housed in the CPC but report to the CiO.

¶3. (C) The GoR also continues to hold to its red line that it will not accept monitors in South Ossetia. Polishuk rejected any discussion on a definition of a zone of conflict or area of operations for military monitors as a route for compromise. Instead, he recalled the situation after World War II, when the U.S., UK, France, and Russia had forces in Germany and Austria, but not in the U.S. or the USSR. In addition, he repeated the standard line that Russia would not be able to get the South Ossetians to agree. While conceding that it would be useful for the OSCE monitors to obtain South Ossetian and Russian views when reporting on incidents over the administrative boundary, he said that such reports "are not within the mission's mandate."

¶4. (C) Polishuk underlined that Russia was "in no hurry to renew the mission's mandate" to Georgia. He said that the MFA would support a technical roll-over for the twenty monitors in Georgia proper "who are responsible for monitoring implementation of the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement," but that it would not support renewal of the office in Tblisi

as it is currently proposed. He allowed that Russia might reconsider its position on the Georgia mission, if a framework could be established for the organization's reporting mechanisms to Vienna.

Comment

15. (C) The Ambassador will have an opportunity this week to push DFM Karasin on the hard-line stance presented by the MFA working level, which was clearly intent on underscoring to us Russia's willingness to nix an acceptable compromise.

BEYRLE